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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to present an analysis of the effectiveness of the checkpoint and safe 
haven system developed by the NPS, which was put to the test during the 2007 event.  The open 
park space used for festival activities, combined with a severe lightening storm that occurred, 
created a life threatening situation that mandated complete evacuation of the National Mall.  
Therefore, as part of a larger study, researchers were able to provide detailed documentation 
regarding how well NPS facilities and services met the crisis challenge that emerged at the 2007 
National Independence Day Celebration. Overall, the study found that the NPS evacuation plan 
worked effectively.  The designated shelters utilized existing facilities near the festival area.  
These safe havens were accessible and comfortable.  Further, the emergency headquarters area 
was well organized and included representatives from key organizations. Despite the overall 
success of the risk management plan, weaknesses were detected.  Communication after the initial 
evacuation was extremely poor.  While most visitors took the waiting period in stride, there were 
a number who exhibited frustration due to a complete lack of weather updates as well as an 
unknown plan of action for the remaining event.  A structured means of providing ongoing 
information with the public during an evacuation waiting period is essential so that visitors can 
make informed decisions regarding whether to stay or leave. Managers of outdoor festivals 
around the globe are subject to the precarious temperament of Mother Nature.  Much can be 
learned from analyzing large-scale events, where both the points of success and the areas in 
need of improvement can be applied to festivals of any scope.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Tourism-based events are subject to a myriad of risks that planners must anticipate and 
subsequently mitigate in order to protect both people and assets.  For a large scale festival held in 
an open space, weather conditions present a particular challenge (Jones, Scott & Khaled, 2006).  
In a study regarding thirty attributes that lead to festival failure, weather was perceived as the 
second most likely contributing factor, following lack of corporate sponsorship (Getz, 2002). 
The unpredictability of weather coupled with recent trends in climate change and global 
warming make management control particularly challenging.  Accordingly, contingency 
planning becomes pivotal in festival management in order to set up advance decisions that can be 
used to address complex emergent situations (Glaesser, 2006).  
The National Mall and Memorial Parks (National Mall), a unit of the United States 
National Park Service (NPS), is comprised of over 1,000 acres of parkland in Washington DC, 
where the equivalent of 14,000 event days are held on an annual basis (NPS, 2007; 2008).  One 
of the largest of these events is the National Independence Day Celebration.  This one-day event 
is held in conjunction with the Smithsonian Folklife Festival, includes a variety of activities such 
as the National Independence Day Parade and the PBS broadcasted Fourth of July Concert, and 
culminates with a massive fireworks display.  While government regulations prohibit event 
planners from taking headcounts on the National Mall, ad-hoc evidence suggests that the 
National Independence Day Celebration draws between 500,000 and 1 million revelers annually.  
Thus, the level and intensity of visitation places extreme demands on the National Mall’s 
infrastructure, management, and services.  Further, the National Independence Day Celebration 
presents unique security demands, as the parklands are surrounded by historic monuments, 
memorials and federal administrative buildings.  Accordingly, the presence of security 
checkpoints and the establishment of elaborate contingency plans for risk management are a 
necessary part of the planning process. 
  The purpose of this study is to present an analysis of the effectiveness of the checkpoint 
and safe haven system developed by the NPS, which was put to the test during the 2007 event.  
The open park space used for festival activities, combined with a severe lightening storm that 
occurred, created a life threatening situation that mandated complete evacuation of the National 
Mall.  Therefore, as part of a larger study, researchers were able to provide detailed 
documentation regarding how well NPS facilities and services met the crisis challenge that 
emerged at the 2007 National Independence Day Celebration.   
 
METHODS 
 
Using a participant observation approach, systematic data collection occurred in two 
major time periods, broken into four shifts, on July 4, 2007.  Six researchers were present from 
10:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. and then a new team of six researchers was on site from 4:00 p.m. 
until 10:00 p.m.  Four data collection zones were defined, each of which had a minimum of one 
dedicated researcher who would systematically record observations.  After a 3-hour shift, 
researchers would switch places and collect data in a different zone for another 3 hours.  All 
members of the research team wore NPS volunteer hats and badges.  Data collection was purely 
observational and no attempt was made to interact with the festival visitors.  Relevant visitor 
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comments that were overheard were documented, but no interaction took place and no requests 
for information were made.      
The data collection instrument was constructed with considerable input from NPS staff.  
The instrument facilitated an "observation trail" approach that reflected the sampling area.  The 
instrument included a checklist and comment form that allowed for systematic assessments of 
checkpoints, information transmission and public safety.  Additional services (e.g., 
food/beverage service, restrooms, etc.) were documented, but are not being considered for the 
current study.   
The sampling area was identified and mapped based on subzone information provided by 
the NPS.  Based on the layout of the National Mall and surrounding areas, these subzones were 
categorized into four data collection zones, moving from east to west across the National Mall.  
The two maps at the end of this abstract illustrate the layout.  The first map includes the zones 
and notations of the checkpoints that were observed for the study (Figure 1) while the second 
includes the subzones (Figure 2).  Zone 1 comprised the east end of the National Mall from 3rd 
Street to 7th Street.  Subzones L, M and N were contained in this area.  Zone 2 encompassed the 
west end of the National Mall from 7th Street to 14th Street.  Subzones O, P and Q were contained 
in this area.  Zones 1 and 2 also included Folklife Festival activities.  Zone 3 included the 
Washington Monument and the surrounding vicinity.  Subzones R, S, T, U-1, U-2, V, W-1, W-2, 
X-1 and X-2 were contained in this area.  Zone 4 housed the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 
Korean War Veterans Memorial, the Lincoln Memorial and the surrounding vicinity.  Subzones 
GG-1, GG-2, II, JJ-1, JJ-2, JJ-4 and 00-3 were contained in this area.  The area encompassing the 
World War II Memorial, Constitution Gardens, and Reflecting Pool enclosed the ignition area 
for fireworks and associated safety zone where visitors were not permitted and therefore was not 
considered for data collection.    
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Figure 1.  Zones and Check Points. 
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Figure 2. Subzones 
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FINDINGS 
 
At approximately 5:10 p.m. public announcements regarding a National Weather Service 
advisory for severe thunderstorms began.  This statement was followed by information 
pertaining to a mandatory evacuation and the location of “safe havens.”  However, as there was 
no central announcement system for the entire National Mall area, police officers were 
dispatched by car, bike and on foot to quickly spread the message by loudspeaker for those not in 
the immediate proximity of one of the several public address systems.  Visitors were sent to the 
nearest museums (e.g., Smithsonian Museum of Art), monuments (e.g., Washington Monument), 
or federal buildings (e.g., US Department of Commerce) that were pre-designated as safe haven 
shelters.  Because visitors could only exit from security checkpoints, the police officers, 
firefighters, and security guards facilitating movement were able to answer questions and guide 
people to the nearest shelter.  By 5:45 p.m., the entire festival area was evacuated.   
During the evacuation period, visitors were given access to exhibits and displays in safe 
havens where such diversions were available (i.e., museums).  Visitors were not required to stay 
in the safe havens; however, most remained based on the anticipation that the fireworks display 
would still take place.  No update was given until the National Mall was reopened at 7:00 p.m.  
When the festival area reopened, visitors were required to go through the checkpoints again. 
Although reentry lines were long, the process was facilitated by the removal of several 
barricades that allowed many of the checkpoints to be widened.  The surge led to inconsistencies 
in processing, however, as it was noted that at some checkpoints the rigorous standards 
documented earlier in the day were being enforced while officials at other checkpoints were 
simply waving visitors into the festival area during the post-evacuation reentry period.  At one 
checkpoint, when lax reentry oversight was detected by a lead official, security guards were sent 
out to recall as many of these visitors as possible, who had to wait in line yet again.  This 
resulted in a significant amount of irritation and complaint.     
 
APPLICATION OF RESULTS 
 
With heightened awareness of catastrophic events such as terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters, there is an increasing sensitivity regarding risk management and contingency planning 
for large tourism-based events.  As the case study of the 2007 National Independence Day 
Celebration illustrates, having a structured plan of action to address the possibility of inclement 
weather is an essential part of ensuring visitor safety.  
Overall, the NPS evacuation plan worked effectively.  The designated shelters utilized 
existing facilities near the festival area.  These safe havens were accessible and comfortable.  
Further, the emergency headquarters area was well organized and included representatives from 
key organizations such as the National Weather Service, DC Police, NPS Police, Smithsonian 
Museums and additional emergency services.  Once the evacuation was deemed necessary, the 
rapid communication of essential information allowed for a timely and orderly evacuation.  
Despite the overall success of the risk management plan, weaknesses were detected.  
Communication after the initial evacuation was extremely poor.  While most visitors took the 
waiting period in stride, there were a number who exhibited frustration due to a complete lack of 
weather updates as well as an unknown plan of action for the remaining event.  A structured 
means of providing ongoing information with the public during an evacuation waiting period is 
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essential so that visitors can make informed decisions regarding whether to stay or leave.  This 
waiting period plan must be communicated among all levels of security personnel to avoid 
inconsistency and confusion when the reopening and reentry occur.  Further, when reentry takes 
place, safety standards should not be compromised in the interest of efficiency.      
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Managers of outdoor festivals around the globe are subject to the precarious temperament 
of Mother Nature.  Much can be learned from analyzing large-scale events, where both the points 
of success and the areas in need of improvement can be applied to festivals of any scope.  While 
just one of many significant risks to be accounted for, inclement weather is perhaps the most 
likely to be realized.   
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